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OPINION
The Changing Contours of the
Criminal Law
Gary Slapper*
Professor of Law, Director of the Centre for Law, The Open University
The criminal law is sometimes accused of being applied disproportion-
ately against the weaker and poorer elements of society. It is true that
what seem to be large-scale offences are often unprosecuted. If a crime
is big enough it can cease to be seen as a crime. Thus, in an old proverb,
if you steal a chicken you become despised as a chicken thief whereas
if you steal a kingdom you become a king. The idea is also reflected
in the observation of Honoré de Balzac that ‘Laws are spider webs
through which big flies pass and the little ones get caught’ (La Maison
Nucingen (1838)).
An example of the limited application of the criminal law is that the
legal duty to stop someone from dying is economically confined. In
England and Wales, more than 23,000 elderly people died as a result of
being too cold last winter. The year before, the unnecessary death toll
was 29,000. Rod Griffiths, a senior public health official, stated in
November 2006 that the lives of thousands of elderly people are at risk
because they cannot afford to heat their homes. The charity Age Con-
cern requested a £100 rise in the winter fuel payment but government
ministers rejected this request.
Government could prevent such large-scale loss of life by increasing
the winter fuel payments to old people but it seems that it will not do
so; its inaction, however, is clearly outside the jurisdiction of the
criminal law.
In general there is, in English law, no legal obligation to help someone
in danger. The law is characterised by Arthur Hugh Clough’s observation
(published posthumously in 1962) in The Latest Decalogue: ‘Thou shalt
not kill; but need’st not strive officiously to keep alive’.
There are, though, some circumstances in which acquiescing in an
unnecessary death is punishable. Homicide by gross negligence is un-
lawful. This offence can be committed by an omission to act if the culprit
has a duty to intervene, as does a prison to its prisoner or a hospital to its
in-patient. An omission might also be criminal where the deceased was
a social or familial dependant of the person or institution which failed to
act. Parents who permit their young dependent children to starve could
be convicted of manslaughter. This type of crime, though, has never
been applied to any governmental inaction. Governmental inaction
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while elderly people die from the cold is not a crime, although it is not
hard to see why many people would use the word ‘criminal’ to describe
such a situation.
It is true that many elderly people are dependent on the State. It is
also clear that government has a moral duty to help protect its citizens—
that much is already evidenced by the existence of the winter fuel
payment system. How much money is spent, though, is a political
decision, and it cannot be argued in a law court. It is a non-justiciable
issue, and does not become justiciable however contestable are govern-
mental spending priorities. Consider a recent decision in contrast to the
negative one on winter fuel payments. The Culture minister, Tessa
Jowell, recently told Parliament (Hansard, 5 December, 2006, col. 287W,
and see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6167504.stm, accessed 15
January 2007) that a slip in the Olympic financial accounting had
entailed the need for some previously unforeseen extra cash: £900
million. No government minister has, in consequence, called for the
2012 London Olympics to be cancelled. Government will find that extra
£900 million. We have joined-up government responsible for co-
ordinated policy on both geriatric health, and the Olympics. The energy
bill to stop 20,000 old people from freezing to death, according to the
relevant charities, is about £2 million. But the decision to pledge £900
million on fun and commerce while denying dependent elderly people
the £2 million of life-preserving fuel is quite lawful—spreadsheet man-
slaughter is not a crime known to the law. Article 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to life, but it has not
been applied in a way that would assist those endangered this winter.
What this matter of ‘avoidable death without legal culpability’ illus-
trates is the inadequacy of any definition of criminal law founded alone
upon the serious nature of morally reprehensible harms. It shows that,
notwithstanding the crime of corporate killing being specifically crimi-
nalised in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, at
least one type of deliberative committee decision-making resulting in
unnecessary death will remain perfectly lawful. This is not to argue that
the avoidable deaths of the old people who will die this winter from the
cold should necessarily be treated as a crime, but to demonstrate
the limits of the criminal law. 
Legal institutional responsibility for death by omission to act is known
in another branch of the law. Outside the normal categories of the
criminal and civil law, such avoidable deaths are within the category of
‘death by neglect’ used in coroners’ courts. In R v HM Coroner for North
Humberside and Scunthorpe, ex p. Jamieson [1994] 3 All ER 972 at 991, Sir
Thomas Bingham MR noted that:
. . . Neglect in this context means a gross failure to provide adequate
nourishment or liquid, or provide or procure basic medical attention
or shelter or warmth for someone in a dependent position (because of
youth, age, illness or incarceration) who cannot provided it for themselves.
(emphasis added)
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Referring, however, to the similar verdict in a coroner’s court of death
caused by ‘lack of care’, Croom Johnson LJ said in R v Southwark Coroner,
ex p. Hicks [1987] 2 All ER 140 at 146 that:
This verdict should not be used as a means of levelling disguised criticism at
people who do not act in an emergency or take a wrong or inadequate
decision in such cases. I doubt if the inaction of the priest and the Levite
who passed by on the other side would have justified such a verdict . . .
Turning to the broader issue of criminal law being limited by the political
economy, what is the distinguishing characteristic of a crime? What puts
one type of wrong in the category of a crime, and keeps another as a civil
wrong? The truth is that there is no scientific way of differentiating
wrongs on that basis. It is impossible to be definitive about the nature of
a crime because the essence of criminality changes with historical con-
text. As Glanville Williams has observed (Textbook of Criminal Law
(1983) 27):
. . . a crime (or offence) is a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal
proceedings which may result in punishment.
Lending money and charging interest was, anciently, the crime of usury.
Now if done successfully it might earn a banker a knighthood. Cocaine
used to be a legal narcotic used both for recreational purposes and
toothache, now it is illegal.
A crime is anything that the State has chosen to criminalise. This
analysis was taken by Lord Atkin, who said (in Proprietary Articles Trade
Association v Attorney-General for Canada [1931] AC 310 at 324):
The domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by exam-
ining what acts at any particular period are declared by the State to be
crimes, and the only common nature they will be found to possess is that
they are prohibited by the State and that those who commit them are
punished.
So what conduct does society criminalise? In general, that which is so
inimical to society that it would be unsuitable to be left to be settled by
private law. Misconduct at which we want society, not just the injured
party, to register it has been hurt. However, not all that glisters is gold,
and not all that is abhorrent is criminal. There are many things that are
seriously condemned by people but which are not crimes. It is some-
times the case that considerations of political economy come into play
and prevent something harmful being seen as a crime. There are clear
reasons why it would be difficult to argue that a government was guilty
of spreadsheet manslaughter on account of the economic spending
decisions it made, even if, because of its priorities, those decisions
inevitably entailed unnecessary death.
The point that all this goes to show is a simple one: that there is
outside the purview of the criminal law conduct of comparable moral
culpability and harmfulness as conduct that is within it. However, the
content and contours of the criminal law change with the times. So
perhaps, one day, some form of spreadsheet manslaughter—the de-
liberate setting of peacetime spending priorities that will almost cer-
tainly result in the premature and avoidable death of citizens from acute
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causes, and which does do so—will become criminal. Such law would
not entail governments being prosecuted for homicide left, right, and
centre but it would mark out an important criterion of civilised govern-
ment. Similarly, the Genocide Act 1969 has never been used but that
does not mean it is a useless law. 
That might seem far-fetched but then, when first mooted, so did the
idea of prosecuting a company for manslaughter. The distinct legal
personality of a company was widely seen as something to which benefit
could attach (limited shareholder liability) and from which corporate
civil liability could flow. That a company could commit unlawful homi-
cide, though, was not appreciated. Until quite modern times, companies
were seen as capable of criminal wrongs but only of non-violent crimi-
nal wrongs. In fact, prosecuting a company for homicide was still being
seen by some as impossible right up to the first corporate manslaughter
prosecution in 1965. Today, though, corporate manslaughter is an em-
bedded feature of the criminal law, and is the subject of a dedicated
23-section piece of legislation.
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